. the necessary formalities and invited the counterparties to refinance the vehicle as agreed. It is also alleged that the counterparties retained Form 35 relating to the fictitious agreement, although . Refusal to refinance the vehicle. It is also alleged that the complainant asked the counterparties to return Form 35 in respect of the loan agreement, but that they did not return the considerations. – A fictitious contract of 26.12.2009. It is also alleged that Shri Roshal Lal lonaee did not pay the loan amount in the amount of 1213364/ – (Twelve lake thirteen thousand three Sushil Kumar against Shri Ram. . . against the safety of the offending vehicle on the other by a mortgage made by and between the parties. By this agreement, the vehicle remained in the custody of the pawnshop and possession. This was never transferred to the locker.
Contrary to a deposit in which the possession of the mortgaged thing is transferred to the holder of pledges, in case of pledging, the possession of the borrower on pawns is taken. The term “pledging of cargo” has been described as “pledging of cargo without immediate change of ownership; it gives to the person who progresses in faith in him, the right that. The transfer of funds to the borrower is an essential element of the loan agreement: nevertheless, case law has always considered that the material transfer is not necessary, since it is sufficient for the intended size of the contract, that the borrower benefits from the legal availability of the sum. . the vehicle was the subject of a corpse agreement and was in possession and control under respondent 2. The High Court is both in the main judgment and in the verification. that there is a common thread, that the person in possession of the vehicle under the corpse contract has been treated as the owner. Needless to say if the vehicle is insured. The control and possession of the vehicle under a paving agreement should be interpreted as owners and not as a single registered owner, after which the Court has notified the legislature. . It is kept as a guarantee.
In case of unprehension, the property remains in the hands of the administrator, but the administrator has the right to take possession of the mortgaged property and to have it. the exploitation of debt secured by borrowing. The bank was free to take possession of the bankrupt property, alone or through the court, but it was unable to do so. It was also open for. the official liquidator without notification to the bank.2. The official liquidator, who denied any knowledge of the mortgage, opposed the bank`s request. It is in the process of being tabled. By a reversal began with the decision nr. 17352 and 19015 of 2017, as did the recent decision No.
6586/2018, the Supreme Court set out the other legal principle, according to which “the violation of the 80% ceiling for loans granted in accordance with Article 38 of the Banking Law is at the origin of the nullity of the credito fondiario loan and that this limit is essential for the qualification of the mortgage loan as a credito fondiario, its violation entails the automatic nullity of the entire contract, with the exception of the possibility of converting it into another type of mortgage loan contract if the corresponding conditions are met”. . Petitioners pursuant to section 138/141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The petitioners had with the counterpart no. 2, the company, concluded a loan-surety guarantee contract. In. Purpose of the loan and provident contract. This asset has already been sold in liquidation of counterparty No. 2`s claims under the above-mentioned agreement.
It also presents. Reduction of the liability of the loan and provident contract. The entire claim of counterparty No 2 has not been liquidated and therefore cannot be said to. . Ypothecateee. However, the seizure and seizure justify a special relationship of the goods in favour of the creditor or the secured creditor. . . .